

INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

May 27, 2020
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TO: The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners

FROM: Chief of Police

SUBJECT: OFFICER INVOLVED SHOOTING FID NO. 035-19

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Honorable Members:

The following is my review, analysis, and findings for Officer Involved Shooting (OIS), Force Investigation Division (FID) No. 035-19. A Use of Force Review Board (UOFRB) was convened on this matter on April 20, 2020. In this case, the recommended findings were not unanimous, with a minority opinion rendered regarding the Tactics findings for Officers K. Lockwood, Serial No. 38804, and A. Castanon, Serial No. 41832, 77th Street Area, Gang Enforcement Detail (GED).

I have carefully weighed each opinion, considered the case in its entirety and have adopted the recommendations of the UOFRB majority's opinion for the Tactics findings for Officers Lockwood and Castanon. I hereby submit my findings in accordance with Police Commission policy.

SUMMARY¹

On July 26, 2019, Officers Lockwood and Castanon were in full police uniform, driving a marked black and white hybrid police vehicle.² Officers Lockwood and Castanon had worked together numerous times over a three-year period, while assigned to 77th Street Patrol Division, and had been assigned to 77th Street Area GED as partners for approximately three weeks prior to the OIS. Officers Lockwood and Castanon had previously discussed general tactics related to contact and cover, foot pursuit tactics, and specifically the containment of armed suspects after the initiation of a foot pursuit.

At approximately 2141 hours, Officers Lockwood and Castanon were conducting extra patrol in the area of Vermont Square Park located at 1256 West 47th Street. Officers Lockwood and Castanon observed approximately 80 to 100 individuals gathered in the park near the picnic tables, which according to Officer Lockwood was unusual based on the time of day, considering the park closed nightly to the public at 2100 hours.

¹ The summary and the investigation completed by FID for this incident have been provided to the Board of Police Commissioners.

² A hybrid police vehicle is a marked black and white police vehicle without an overhead light bar, but is equipped with a forward facing red-light and siren.

According to Officer Lockwood, he had been assigned to 77th Street Area GED for a combined total of more than three years and at the time of the incident he was on his second tour. While assigned to 77th Street Area GED, Officer Lockwood was tasked with monitoring *the Rolling 40's Crips* criminal street gang, which provided him with specific expertise and knowledge of the gang. Officer Lockwood would, on a regular basis, drive by the Vermont Square Park which was a *known hangout for Rolling 40's Crips gang members* to determine if there were gang members gathered in the park and if criminal activity was occurring. Based on Officer Lockwood's experience and expertise, it was *not unusual for 20 to 30 gang members to be hanging out, loitering, and drinking alcoholic beverages in the park.*

According to the FID investigation, in the past, Officers Lockwood and Castanon had encountered similar situations of large groups of individuals loitering in the park, which involved criminal activity. Officers Lockwood and Castanon's general practice was to walk toward the particular group of individuals gathered in the park and observe if anyone appeared to be *trying to evade contact, get away, or armed with a weapon.* During their previous encounters, Officers Lockwood and Castanon would advise each other of their observations, including the description of the individual they were focusing on, and coordinate the response of additional units to contain and apprehend the individual **(Debriefing Point No. 1).**

Officer Lockwood stated that as he exited his police vehicle, he and Officer Castanon intended to use a similar strategy by conducting consensual encounters on individuals loitering in the park to observe if anyone *drew their attention* **(Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Required Equipment).**

According to Officer Lockwood, immediately upon exiting his police vehicle and entering the park on foot, he observed an unidentified male *in a white tank top* grab the hand of an unidentified female, and start to *immediately walk away from the benches* where the majority of the individuals were gathered. Officer Lockwood believed the unidentified male was *trying to kind of evade contact with us*, which *drew his attention.* Officer Lockwood communicated his observations to Officer Castanon and they walked by the unidentified male, conducted a brief consensual encounter. The officers then continued to walk south into the park. Additionally, Officer Lockwood observed *numerous people drinking alcoholic beverages* and believed the group was *a little agitated.*

According to Officer Castanon, when he and Officer Lockwood exited their police vehicle, they observed numerous individuals whom they *recognized as known Rolling 40's Crips gang members who frequently drank alcohol and smoked marijuana inside the park.* As Officers Castanon and Lockwood entered the park on foot and began to walk south, they observed various individuals *drinking alcoholic beverages and smelled the odor of marijuana inside the park.* Officer Castanon approached two individuals and *shined his light* on an unidentified male wearing a white tank top who appeared to be leaving the park as Officers Castanon and Lockwood began walking in his direction. Officer Castanon indicated that the *lighting* in the park was poor. Officers Castanon and Lockwood had a brief conversation with the unidentified male prior to breaking contact and continuing to walk through the park **(Additional/Equipment - BWV Activation).**

According to the FID investigation, at 2141:30 hours, approximately 40 seconds after Officers Lockwood and Castanon had exited their police vehicle and entered the park on foot, Officer Lockwood utilized his hand-held police radio to broadcast that his unit was at 47th Street and Budlong Avenue and requested *two additional units* for a *415 group*. Officers Lockwood and Castanon continued walking through the park in a southwesterly direction when Officer Lockwood observed an unidentified male, later identified as J. Edmond, and a second unidentified male walking east through the park and then south on Budlong Avenue (**Debriefing Point No. 2**).

According to Officer Lockwood, as he and Officer Castanon continued walking through the center of the park *around the west side of a group* of people loitering, he observed *two males* walking east through the park toward Budlong Avenue. Officer Lockwood believed Edmond and the second unidentified male were attempting to *evade contact*, which *drew his attention* to them. Officer Lockwood began to run after Edmond and the second individual in order to ascertain if they were *trying to get away* from the officers or if they were *just people that were leaving the park* (**Debriefing Point No. 1**).

According to Officer Lockwood, as he and Officer Castanon reached the west sidewalk of Budlong Avenue south of 47th Street, he observed Edmond and the unidentified male and *illuminated them with his flashlight*. Edmond looked in the direction of the officers and *appeared very startled by their presence*. Edmond *slipped and fell* as he attempted to run *westbound up the pathway* into the courtyard of a multi-unit apartment complex at 4723 South Budlong Avenue. As Edmond fell, Officer Lockwood observed Edmond *grab at his right front pocket, grabbing onto what appeared to be an unknown heavy object*, and Officer Lockwood formed the opinion that Edmond was armed with a handgun and was *attempting to gain access to a firearm*. Officers Lockwood and Castanon immediately initiated a foot pursuit of Edmond, and believed they were in *containment mode* while attempting to maintain sight of Edmond.

According to Officer Castanon, he did not initially observe Edmond leaving the park. Officer Castanon believed Officer Lockwood *might have said something that caught his attention*. Officer Lockwood began to run east toward Budlong Avenue with Officer Castanon *no more than 5 to 10 feet* behind him. As Officer Castanon followed behind Officer Lockwood south on the west sidewalk of Budlong Avenue, Officer Castanon observed Edmond *running*. Officer Castanon observed Edmond *lose his balance* and *stumble* followed by Edmond regaining *his footing*. When Edmond stumbled, Officer Lockwood who was in front of Officer Castanon *gained a lot of distance* on Edmond and came within *5 to 10 feet* of Edmond. Additionally, Edmond *appeared to have his hands or his arms near his body and near his waistline area* which caused Officer Castanon to believe Edmond was *possibly armed with a gun*. Officer Castanon followed Officer Lockwood in foot pursuit of Edmond, and broadcast that they were in *foot pursuit of a 415 man with a gun at 47th Street and Budlong Avenue* (**Debriefing Point No. 3**).

According to the FID investigation, Edmond ran west into the courtyard of a multi-unit apartment complex located at 4721 South Budlong Avenue. At 2141:56 hours, Officer Castanon

used his hand-held police radio to broadcast a *back-up* request for a *415 man with a gun* at 47th Street and *Budlong Avenue* (**Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Foot Pursuit Broadcast**).³

According to the FID investigation, Officer Lockwood pursued Edmond west through the apartment complex, Officer Lockwood drew his service pistol and ordered Edmond to show his hands and get on the ground. Officer Castanon ordered Edmond to get down on the ground as he followed in foot pursuit behind Officer Lockwood (**Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Non-Conflicting Simultaneous Commands and Additional/Equipment - Profanity**).

According to the FID investigation, Officers Lockwood and Castanon continued to pursue Edmond on foot west through an exterior walkway and into a rear courtyard of the apartment complex (**Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Running with Service Pistol Drawn**).

According to Officer Lockwood, based on Edmond's actions of avoiding contact, his attempt to flee, as well as Edmond grabbing onto a heavy object in his pants pocket, Officer Lockwood believed Edmond was in possession of a handgun and attempting to gain access to the weapon to arm himself. Officer Lockwood drew his service pistol with his right hand to a *modified low-ready*, while holding his flashlight in his left hand as he pursued Edmond through a *narrow pathway*, based on his belief that the *tactical situation could lead to the use of deadly force* (**Drawing/Exhibiting**).

According to Officer Lockwood, he *briefly* lost *sight* of Edmond as Edmond ran around a corner of the apartment complex and into a rear courtyard area. As Officer Lockwood ran past the corner of the building Officer Lockwood regained sight of Edmond and observed Edmond *turning back towards* Officer Lockwood. Officer Lockwood observed that Edmond had a *pistol grip* on a *black handgun* in his left hand. Based on Edmond's movement, Officer Lockwood believed that Edmond *was turning to shoot at him*. Officer Lockwood fired his service pistol three times, utilizing a one-handed grip, in order to defend himself from the deadly threat presented by Edmond (**Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Single Handed Shooting**).⁴

Note: The FID investigation revealed Officer Lockwood fired four rounds from his service pistol.

According to Officer Lockwood, based on the minimal amount of time Officer Lockwood had to react, he stated he was unable to use the sights of his service pistol to gain a sight picture and was *point shooting* (**Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Target Acquisition**).⁵

According to Officer Lockwood, he assessed as he fired his service pistol in order to determine if *his shots were hitting and were being effective*. Officer Lockwood continued to fire his service pistol until he *no longer believed* Edmond was an *immediate threat*. Officer Lockwood observed

³ Officer Castanon believed he broadcast that he and Officer Lockwood were in foot pursuit, however, the FID investigation revealed he only broadcast a back-up request.

⁴ The one-handed shooting of a service pistol is trained by the Department.

⁵ Officer Lockwood described "point shooting" as attempting to point his firearm in the direction of the suspect and getting a close proximity hit. The technique of point shooting is taught during Department training.

Edmond fall to the ground at which time Officer Lockwood *stopped firing*. Immediately after Edmond fell to the ground, Officer Lockwood *observed the firearm hit the ground* in close proximity to Edmond (**Lethal Use of Force**).

According to the FID investigation, Officer Lockwood was approximately five to seven feet from Edmond during the OIS. Officer Lockwood immediately directed Officer Castanon to “Put it out,” indicating for Officer Castanon to broadcast an update of their situation. Officer Lockwood additionally told Edmond, “Do not reach,” referring to the black handgun that was on the ground next to where Edmond had fallen. At 2142:04 hours, as Officer Lockwood gave Edmond commands, Officer Castanon broadcast, “George 27 shots fired, officer needs help, 47 and Budlong.” Officer Lockwood directed Edmond to roll over onto his stomach and advised Officer Castanon, “The gun is behind him (Edmond).” **[Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Situational Awareness (Broadcast wrong unit designation) and Updating Status].**⁶

According to Officer Castanon, he observed a black handgun on the ground next to Edmond shortly after the OIS when Officer Lockwood stated, “Hey, the gun’s on the floor, the gun’s right there.” Officer Castanon was unable to see the handgun initially based on his positioning but was directed to the handgun by Officer Lockwood. As Officer Castanon approached Edmond, he *maintained visual of the firearm* as he placed himself *between Edmond and the firearm*. Officer Castanon then *handcuffed* Edmond.

According to the FID investigation, as Officer Castanon approached Edmond to handcuff him, a black handgun was visible on the ground, within 1 to 2 feet from Edmond’s upper torso. Edmond was bleeding from the gunshot wounds sustained to his right side and right hand (**Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Bloodborne Pathogens**).

At 2142:30 hours, Officer Castanon completed the handcuffing of Edmond as Officer Lockwood used his hand-held police radio to broadcast that Edmond was in custody. As Officer Lockwood was completing his broadcast, witness G. Collins climbed over a chain-link fence which separated the northern portion of the apartment complex from the southern portion of Vermont Square Park and approached Officers Lockwood and Castanon.⁷ As Collins approached, Officer Lockwood broadcast a back-up request for a 415 group, “In the yellow apartments just west of Budlong.” Officer Castanon drew his service pistol to a low ready as he ordered Collins not to approach him and Officer Lockwood (**Drawing/Exhibiting**).

According to Officer Castanon, immediately after he handcuffed Edmond, his *attention* was drawn to Collins. Officer Castanon did not know what Collins’ *intentions* were when Collins *climbed the fence*, considering it was immediately after Officers Castanon and Lockwood had

⁶ Officer Castanon inadvertently identified their unit designation as George 27 when they were assigned George 32.

⁷ Collins was interviewed by FID investigators the night of the OIS. Collins stated he filmed the OIS using his cellular telephone. However, he stated when he was detained by officers, his cellular telephone was confiscated and his recording of the incident had been deleted prior to him receiving his cellular telephone back. On July 30, 2019, Collins advised an FID investigator that he may not have recorded any video related to the OIS. Later that same day, Technical Investigation Division (TID) personnel examined Collins’ cellular telephone and determined video from the OIS was never recorded on Collins’ cellular telephone.

chased Edmond from a gang related gathering, and had been involved in an OIS. Based on his training and experience, Officer Castanon believed Collins *may be armed with a firearm* and an associate gang member attempting to assist Edmond. Officer Castanon drew his service pistol to a *low-ready* as he gave Collins *commands to stay back* based on Collins' actions of climbing a fence adjacent to the OIS location immediately following the OIS. Additionally, Officer Castanon believed the *situation could arise to that point where deadly force would be necessary*.

According to the FID investigation, at 2143:21 hours Officer Castanon requested a rescue ambulance (RA) for "a male black, approximately 30 years of age, conscious and breathing, multiple gunshot wounds." The City of Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) received the request at 2146:17 hours and dispatched emergency medical personnel. The time from the RA request to the RA's arrival at scene was eight minutes 31 seconds. The time from the RA request to the RA's arrival to Edmond was nine minutes 50 seconds.

The following uniformed personnel responded to the scene and secured the OIS location: Officers M. Peralta, Serial No. 41169, and M. Clark, Serial No. 41636, 77th Street Area, GED, along with Officers B. Nielson, Serial No. 36445, and J. Walker, Serial No. 38023, Metropolitan Division. Additionally, Officer E. Coats, Serial No. 34785, 77th Street Patrol Division also responded. Numerous additional officers from Metropolitan Division, 77th Street Division, Southwest Division and Southeast Division responded to the scene, secured the area, and formed a skirmish line to disperse the large group of individuals gathered at Vermont Square Park who became hostile. Collins was detained by additional responding personnel and led out of the OIS crime scene (**Additional/Equipment – BWV Activation**).

According to the FID investigation, Officer Nielson, who had training in tactical medical treatment, provided Edmond emergency medical treatment for his injuries.⁸ Officer Nielson retrieved a trauma kit from his police vehicle, and after assessing Edmond's injuries, applied a chest seal to a gunshot wound on Edmond's right side and attempted to make Edmond comfortable until the RA arrived at scene.

According to the FID investigation, Sergeant A. Navarro, Serial No. 35321, 77th Street Area, GED, was the first supervisor to arrive at the OIS location in the rear of 4721 South Budlong Avenue. Upon his arrival at scene, Sergeant Navarro observed a skirmish line that had been formed to contain the large crowd in Vermont Square Park. Sergeant Navarro believed the scene was contained at the time and responded to the rear of 4721 South Budlong Avenue where he located Officers Lockwood and Castanon. Sergeant Navarro immediately determined an OIS had occurred and separated both Officers Lockwood and Castanon. Sergeant Navarro directed Officer Lockwood to turn off his Body Worn Video (BWV), took custody of the BWV, obtained a Public Safety Statement (PSS), and monitored him. Additionally, Sergeant Navarro admonished Officer Lockwood not to discuss the incident. Sergeant Navarro believed he broadcast and declared himself as the Incident Commander (IC). Additionally, Sergeant Navarro directed personnel to secure the crime scene and continued to coordinate resources.

⁸ Officer Nielson received a certification from the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center after attending the Tactical Medical and Tactical Medical Instructor course. It was Officer Nielson's practice to carry the trauma kit issued to him during his medical training while on duty.

According to the FID investigation, Sergeant J. Adkins, Serial No. 35881, 77th Street Area, GED, was the second supervisor to arrive at the OIS location to the rear of 4721 South Budlong Avenue where he located Sergeant Navarro along with Officers Lockwood and Castanon. Sergeant Navarro had already separated Officers Lockwood and Castanon and was in the process of obtaining a PSS from Officer Lockwood. Sergeant Adkins monitored Officer Castanon, verified that Officer Castanon's BWV was deactivated and took custody of the BWV device. Sergeant Adkins obtained a PSS from Officer Castanon. Additionally, Sergeant Adkins admonished Officer Castanon not to discuss the incident. Sergeant Adkins directed an additional GED unit to accompany Edmond to California Hospital Medical Center and assisted with securing the crime scene. Sergeant Adkins continued to monitor Officer Castanon until Officer Castanon was released to FID investigators.

According to the FID investigation, LAFD RA 246, Firefighter/Paramedics Sharlein and Ornelas arrived at the scene at 2156:22 hours. They provided medical treatment for Edmond's gunshot wounds to his right side and right hand. Edmond was transported to California Hospital Medical Center and arrived there at 2208:27 hours, where he was transferred to the care of hospital medical staff. Officer Peralta accompanied Edmond in the RA to the hospital.⁹

According to the FID investigation, at approximately 2201 hours, the Department Operations Center (DOC) was notified of the OIS by Sergeant A. Kaspian, Serial No. 34871, 77th Street Area, Watch Commander.

FINDINGS

Tactics – Administrative Disapproval, Officers Lockwood and Castanon.

Drawing/Exhibiting – In Policy, No Further Action, Officers Lockwood and Castanon.

Lethal Use of Force – In Policy, No Further Action, Officer Lockwood.

ANALYSIS¹⁰

Detention

The involved officers observed a large group gathered during the evening at a park previously known for gang activity. The officers made the determination to conduct consensual encounters while on foot with individuals in the park. Officer Lockwood requested additional units for the large group and observed two individuals, one of who was Edmond, who he believed were attempting to avoid the officers and evade contact. Officers quickly followed after the individuals and located them a short distance away at which time the officers observed Edmond lose his footing, grab a heavy object in the area of his right front pants pocket, and have his

⁹ LAFD personnel were not interviewed due to Officer Peralta's BWV being activated in the RA. Edmond did not make any statements regarding the OIS while enroute to the hospital.

¹⁰ The analysis reflects my recommendations as supported by the preponderance of the evidence established by the FID investigation.

hands near his waistline. Both officers independently formed the opinion that Edmond was armed with a handgun and pursued Edmond on foot through a multi-unit apartment complex as they ordered him to show his hands and get on the ground. Edmond did not comply and continued to flee on foot. The officers were in close proximity to Edmond when he turned towards the officers in a clockwise motion with a black handgun in his left hand, resulting in an OIS. The officers' actions were appropriate and within Department policies and procedures.

Tactics

Department policy relative to a Tactical Debrief is: *"The collective review of an incident to identify those areas where actions and decisions were effective and those areas where actions and decisions could have been improved. The intent of a Tactical Debrief is to enhance future performance."*

Department policy relative to Administrative Disapproval is: *"A finding, supported by a preponderance of the evidence that the tactics employed during a CUOF incident unjustifiably and substantially deviated from approved Department tactical training"* (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 792.05).

The evaluation of tactics requires that consideration be given to the fact that officers are forced to make split-second decisions under very stressful and dynamic circumstances. Tactics are conceptual and intended to be flexible and incident specific, which requires that each incident be looked at objectively and the tactics be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances.

Tactical De-Escalation

Tactical de-escalation involves the use of techniques to reduce the intensity of an encounter with a suspect and enable an officer to have additional options to gain voluntary compliance or mitigate the need to use a higher level of force while maintaining control of the situation.

Tactical De-Escalation Techniques

- *Planning*
- *Assessment*
- *Time*
- *Redeployment and/or Containment*
- *Other Resources*
- *Lines of Communication (Los Angeles Police Department, Use of Force - Tactics Directive No. 16, Tactical De-Escalation Techniques, October 2016)*

Tactical de-escalation does not require that an officer compromise his or her safety or increase the risk of physical harm to the public. De-escalation techniques should only be used when it is safe and prudent to do so.

Planning – Officers Lockwood and Castanon had worked together various times in the past and had addressed general tactics including contact and cover, foot pursuit tactics and the containment of armed suspects. During the officers' discussions regarding foot pursuits of armed suspects, they agreed to follow the suspect and set up containment. During previous situations in which they encountered groups of individuals at various locations, Officer Lockwood stated he and Officer Castanon would walk toward the group to see if anyone appeared to be trying to avoid or evade contact with them. The officers would focus on those individuals and determine if they were armed or were involved in illegal activity. The officers' plan included communicating their observations to each other and then requesting resources to contain and apprehend those individuals. Officers Lockwood and Castanon did not formulate a specific plan for this incident and did not consider utilizing available additional resources in order to conduct a more tactically sound investigation. Based on Officers Lockwood and Castanon's knowledge of gang activity at the location I would have preferred they establish surveillance of the group. I would have preferred that Officers Lockwood and Castanon not base their enforcement action on the mere fact that an individual avoids contact or runs from them as this could result in officers engaging in foot pursuit without reasonable suspicion, or reasonable resources.

In this incident, Officers Lockwood and Castanon observed Edmond lose his balance and grasp a heavy object in the area of his right front pants pocket and have his hands near his waistline. The officers independently formed the opinion that Edmond was armed with a handgun and initiated foot pursuit of him. Officers Lockwood and Castanon pursued Edmond through a multi-unit apartment complex with minimal distance between them and Edmond in order to maintain a visual of Edmond, to prevent him from entering nearby apartments and prevent his escape. This incident would have benefitted with the coordination and pre-planning of Officers Lockwood and Castanon with other available additional resources.

Assessment – Officers Lockwood and Castanon assessed the situation as they observed a large group of individuals that were gathered at Vermont Square Park after the park was closed to the public. The officers elected to place themselves on foot patrol to gain further information and requested two additional units to respond to the location due to the size of the crowd. Officer Lockwood observed Edmond begin to leave the park and believed he was attempting to evade contact. The officers followed behind Edmond to determine if he was armed with a weapon or if any criminal activity was occurring. Officers Lockwood and Castanon observed Edmond lose his balance and grasp a heavy object in the area of his front right pants pocket.

The officers' assessment led them to believe Edmond was armed with a handgun and Officer Lockwood drew his service pistol as he proceeded to pursue Edmond on foot. Officer Lockwood observed Edmond turn toward him with a black handgun, assessed the deadly threat and fired four rounds from his service pistol at Edmond. Officer Lockwood assessed as he fired the four rounds and considered if Edmond still presented an imminent threat after each round fired. Officer Lockwood continued to assess after the OIS and advised Officer Castanon that Edmond's handgun had fallen on the ground next him. Officer Lockwood assessed the tactical situation immediately after the OIS and directed Officer Castanon to handcuff and take Edmond into custody as he was in close proximity to the officers and was lying unsecured next

to a handgun. Additionally, Officer Castanon assessed the situation immediately following the OIS and broadcast an officer needs help call as well as requested an RA for Edmond's injuries.

Time – After observing Edmond lose his balance and grasp a heavy object in the area of his right front pants pocket, Officers Lockwood and Castanon immediately pursued Edmond and ordered him to get down on the ground and put his hands up. As they continued to pursue him through a multi-unit apartment complex, Officer Lockwood observed Edmond, suddenly and without warning, begin to turn in a clockwise direction toward him while holding a black handgun in his left hand. Officer Lockwood stated he fired his service pistol to protect himself and Officer Castanon from the deadly threat Edmond presented. Edmond's actions and escalation of the encounter did not afford the officers additional time to respond to his deadly actions and significantly limited their tactical options.

Redeployment and/or Containment – Upon locating Edmond and observing him lose his balance and grasp a heavy object in the area of his right front pants pocket, Officers Lockwood and Castanon formed the opinion that Edmond was armed with a handgun. Officers Lockwood and Castanon initiated a foot pursuit and pursued Edmond through a multi-unit apartment complex. As Edmond entered the courtyard area of the complex, he abruptly stopped and began to turn in a clockwise direction toward the officers while holding a black handgun in his left hand. Due to the rapid manner in which Edmond turned toward Officers Lockwood and Castanon while armed with a handgun, and the minimal distance between the officers and Edmond, the officers had an extremely limited time in which to react to the deadly threat presented by Edmond. The rapid and dynamic nature of the foot pursuit, coupled with Edmond's actions, in which he unexpectedly turned toward Officers Lockwood and Castanon while armed with a handgun, did not allow distance or time for Officers Lockwood and Castanon to redeploy. While in foot pursuit of Edmond, Officers Lockwood and Castanon's actions and proximity to Edmond indicated they were attempting to apprehend him and were not in containment mode. I would have preferred that once Officers Lockwood and Castanon formed the opinion that Edmond was armed with a firearm they should have discontinued their foot pursuit, gone into containment mode and establish a perimeter in an effort to contain him.

Other Resources – When Officers Lockwood and Castanon initially observed the large group of individuals gathered in Vermont Square Park, they requested two additional units due to the size of the group. Officers Lockwood and Castanon initiated a foot pursuit of Edmond prior to forming the opinion he was armed with a handgun, Officer Castanon requested additional resources to their location when he broadcast a backup request for a man with a gun. Officer Castanon further broadcast an officer needs help call for an OIS and once again requested additional resources to respond for officers confronting a large crowd which had become agitated. Additionally, Officer Castanon requested an RA to respond immediately after the OIS for Edmond's injuries.

Lines of Communication – Officers Lockwood and Castanon initially did not establish clear lines of communication with each other. Officers Lockwood and Castanon relied upon non-verbal cues and minimal verbal communication after they exited their police vehicle. Officer Lockwood directed Officer Castanon's attention to an unidentified individual by briefly pointing

and stating, "Hey, tank top right here," just prior to initiating a consensual encounter with the individual as he was attempting to leave the park. Officers Lockwood and Castanon maintained limited lines of communication as Officer Castanon was alerted by Officer Lockwood's non-verbal cue when he began to run after Edmond.

However once their focus shifted to the apprehension of Edmond, Officers Lockwood and Castanon utilized open lines of communication. Officers Lockwood and Castanon utilized clear direct commands when ordering Edmond to show his hands and get down on the ground as they pursued him. Officer Castanon continued to maintain open lines of communication with Communications Division (CD) when he requested a back-up for a man with a gun. Immediately following the OIS, Officer Lockwood maintained communication with Edmond by directing him to turn over onto his stomach. Officer Castanon once again continued to communicate and update responding units by broadcasting a shots fired, officer needs help call, as well as requesting an RA for Edmond's injuries. Officers Lockwood and Castanon continued to speak to Edmond as Officer Nielson provided medical aid, in an attempt to keep Edmond conscious and assess his injuries.

The UOFRB noted, and I concur, that due to the rapid and dynamic nature of this incident, the involved officers had limited time to react to the deadly actions of Edmond. Officer Lockwood observed Edmond grasp a heavy object in his right front pants pocket while Officer Castanon observed Edmond's hands near his waistline area. Both officers formed the opinion that Edmond was armed with a handgun. Officers Lockwood and Castanon immediately attempted to detain Edmond based on their belief that he was armed with a handgun and posed an immediate danger to the community. Officers Lockwood and Castanon attempted to de-escalate the encounter by giving clear commands directing Edmond to show his hands and get on the ground. The commands were given in an attempt to gain compliance and allow additional time to calmly resolve the incident. However, Edmond did not comply and abruptly turned toward Officers Lockwood and Castanon, armed with a black handgun in his left hand. Edmond's deadly actions, in close proximity to the officers, extremely limited the time and options the officers had, and forced them to react to the imminent deadly threat presented toward them. Officers were required to make decisions that balanced the safety of the community and their own welfare while presented with an imminent deadly threat.

During the review of the incident, the following Debriefing Topics were noted:

Debriefing Point No. 1 Tactical Planning/Communication (Substantial Deviation – Officers Lockwood and Castanon)

Officers must approach every contact, whether a consensual encounter or a lawful detention, with officer safety in mind. Complacency, overconfidence, poor planning, or inappropriate positioning can leave officers vulnerable to attack (California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, Learning Domain 21).

In order to ensure officer safety and help ensure an appropriate outcome, the primary officers and cover officers must effectively communicate with one another. Appropriate communication involves:

- *Advising the primary officer of any critical occurrences or safety issues (e.g., movement within the target vehicle, someone approaching outside the primary officer's field of vision, possible crossfire situations, etc.),*
- *Avoid inappropriate interruptions, and*
- *Avoid giving directions which conflict with those given by the primary officer. Only one person, usually the primary officer, gives the commands, unless a specific situation calls for another officer to issue a command (California Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training, Learning Domain No. 22).*

Officers Lockwood and Castanon failed to develop and communicate a clear tactical plan for the large group of individuals they encountered during the evening at a known gang location.

Operational success is based on the ability of officers to effectively communicate during critical incidents. Officers, when faced with a tactical incident, improve their overall safety by their recognition of an unsafe situation and by working together collectively to ensure a successful resolution. A sound tactical plan should be implemented to ensure minimal exposure to the officers, while keeping in mind officer safety concerns.

In this incident, Officer Lockwood stated he and Officer Castanon intended to follow a strategy they had used in the past by conducting consensual encounters with members of the group while assessing to see if any individuals attempted to evade them. The officers would then ascertain if the individuals attempting to avoid contact were armed or involved in any illegal activity. The officers intended to communicate their observations and direct additional resources to assist with containment and apprehension. According to Officer Lockwood, he observed Edmond attempting to evade contact, however he did not communicate his observation to Officer Castanon, but instead immediately ran after Edmond in order to ascertain if Edmond was armed with a weapon or involved in any illegal activity. The UOFRB majority was critical of Officers Lockwood and Castanon's failure to develop a clear tactical plan, which indicated complacency and a lack of consideration for the unusual size of the group, the specific time of night, and the availability of additional resources.

The UOFRB majority considered that Officer Lockwood is an experienced gang enforcement officer with specific knowledge of the park as well as the Rolling 40's Crips gang, who are known to congregate in the park. The UOFRB majority noted that after observing an unusually large group of individuals gathered at the park during the evening, Officers Lockwood and Castanon had sufficient time to communicate and formulate a focused plan, considering the group was not aggressive nor agitated at the time. The UOFRB majority opined that this lack of communication and planning, which did not take into account the size of the group of individuals, the time of night, as well as the available resources, put the officers at a distinct tactical disadvantage. Officers Lockwood and Castanon did not completely develop or communicate a clear tactical plan between each other or with the inclusion of additional officers.

The UOFRB majority noted that the officers had an unclear plan, and the encounter would have benefitted from a more focused approach with additional planning utilizing all available resources focused on a specific objective.

The UOFRB minority reviewed the same set of facts and opined that Officers Lockwood and Castanon could have taken more time to plan prior to entering the park, but their actions were not a substantial deviation, based on information they had at the time, their observations of the large group of individuals, and the actions taken prior to initiating enforcement. The UOFRB minority noted the officers attempted to communicate with Edmond, as well as update additional resources of the ongoing tactical situation considering the rapid pace in which the incident unfolded.

I would have preferred a more objectively based plan which included more thorough planning, such as having additional resources nearby and out of visual contact. Officers Lockwood and Castanon utilized a poor strategy they had employed in the past, based on the unusually large group of individuals that had congregated in the park at that particular time of night. I would prefer that Officers Lockwood and Castanon not run after individuals who simply evade contact with police but instead establish an observation post and conduct surveillance of individuals they suspect are in possession of weapons or involved in other criminal activity. Once a crime has been established officers should then coordinate with additional resources to contain the suspect and take appropriate enforcement action to ensure the safety of officers and the public. I would have also preferred that Officer Lockwood communicate his observations of Edmond to Officer Castanon prior to taking any action as the officers had planned in prior discussions regarding tactics. Additionally, the incident may have also benefitted from the request for an air unit to respond to the location. This would have allowed for the coordination of additional resources.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB majority determined, and I concur that Officers Lockwood and Castanon's lack of tactical planning and communication was a substantial deviation, without justification, from approved Department tactical training. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Debriefing Point No. 2 Code Six (Substantial Deviation – Officers Lockwood and Castanon)

When a unit is conducting a field investigation and no assistance is anticipated, a "Code Six," followed by the location, shall be broadcast. A unit shall not go "Code Six" until it arrives at the scene of a call.

Units on "Code Six" status shall remain available for reassignment to priority calls by monitoring their radio frequencies. A unit on "Code Six" status may indicate to the dispatcher additional circumstances which will make the unit unavailable for assignment to a priority call. These circumstances may include:

- *Suspect in custody;*
- *Primary unit at a crime scene; and/or,*

- *Required at a backup, assistance, or help location.*

Note: The unit shall notify the dispatcher as soon as it is again available for radio calls (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 4, Section 120.40).

The purpose of broadcasting a Code Six location is to advise CD and officers in the area of the officers' location and the nature of the field investigation, should the incident escalate and necessitate the response of additional personnel. Vehicle and pedestrian stops can be dangerous, as the identity and actions of a person stopped is often unknown, and as in this case, their actions can be unpredictable.

Officers Lockwood and Castanon did not advise CD of their location expeditiously, waited until approximately 40 seconds after they exited their vehicle, and had already entered a significant distance into the park from Budlong Avenue.

The UOFRB majority noted Officer Lockwood is an experienced gang enforcement officer with extensive knowledge of Vermont Square Park, which is a known Rolling 40's Crips gang location. The UOFRB majority was critical of Officers Lockwood and Castanon's action of not broadcasting their Code Six location until approximately 40 seconds after they had parked and exited their police vehicle which the UOFRB majority opined compromised the officers' safety and placed them in a tactically disadvantageous position. The officer's plan was to conduct consensual encounters with individuals inside the park, but their actions contradicted this plan when they approached and questioned individuals and shined their hand-held flashlights at them all prior to going Code Six.

The UOFRB majority noted that Officers Lockwood and Castanon had sufficient time to broadcast their Code Six location, as well as any other relevant information, prior to making contact with any of the individuals in the park. The large group in the park did not appear aggressive or hostile and the officers were not confronted immediately with circumstances or serious criminal activity which would have prevented them from broadcasting their Code Six location. Additionally, Officers Lockwood and Castanon contacted unidentified individuals after entering the park and prior to broadcasting their Code Six location.

The UOFRB minority reviewed the same set of facts and opined that although the officers did not immediately broadcast their Code Six location, it was reasonable and not a substantial deviation, due to the need for the officers to determine what was occurring at the location and obtain the relevant information needed to be broadcast to CD.

Considering Officers Lockwood and Castanon immediately identified an unusually large group of individuals who had congregated at the park during the evening, I would have preferred that the officers broadcast they were Code Six immediately upon exiting their police vehicle. Field investigations may escalate unexpectedly and may require the response of additional resources, as it did in this incident. Therefore, it is essential that officers provide their location and the nature of their investigation in order to keep surrounding resources informed should such a situation arise.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB majority determined, and I concur, that Officers Lockwood and Castanon's failure to broadcast their Code Six location in an expedient manner when provided sufficient time to do so, was a substantial deviation, without justification, from approved Department tactical training. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Debriefing Point No. 3 Apprehension vs. Containment Mode/Pursuing Possibly Armed Suspect (Substantial Deviation – Officers Lockwood and Castanon)

***Apprehension versus Containment:** There are two pursuit modes officers may use when a suspect flees on foot, apprehension mode or containment mode. Some factors that will influence an officer's decision to operate in the apprehension or containment mode are the suspect's actions, officer's experience, training, physical fitness level, location and available resources.*

During apprehension mode, officers work as a team, pursue and attempt to overtake a fleeing suspect until apprehending the suspect, making the decision to discontinue the foot pursuit or transition into containment mode. The pursuing officers should assess and communicate with each other before deciding on a course of action.

Officers may make the decision to discontinue a foot pursuit when the tactical situation deteriorates, either officer becomes injured, or effective communication ability is lost (lost or broken radio or dead spot) or at either officers' discretion. If either of the pursuing officers feels it necessary to end the pursuit, he/she must alert the partner officer quickly to avoid separation.

If the suspect is no longer in sight or enters a structure such as a house, apartment or business, or gains a tactical advantage, officers may make the decision to continue the pursuit in containment mode while coordinating the response of additional units to establish a perimeter. Containing a suspect in a specific area can decrease the opportunity for an ambush and will make it more likely that the suspect will be taken into custody.

When the decision is made to establish a perimeter, officers should act quickly to prevent the suspect's escape and broadcast the following:

- *General location of an incident command post (the end of pursuit location). This location can be moved later.*
- *Boundaries for the perimeter. Remember it is easier to decrease a perimeter than increase one. Initially, even general locations or instructions will suffice. (e.g. 2 blocks to South and North, 2 blocks to East and West of my location).*
- *Request for air unit to assist in establishing or adjusting the perimeter. The presence of the air unit will also encourage the suspect(s) to remain within the perimeter.*
- *Request a supervisor and the necessary resources to safely handle the incident*

(Los Angeles Police Department Use of Force-Tactics Directive No. 3.2, Foot Pursuit Concepts, October 2013).

Pursuing Armed Suspects: *When pursuing a suspect believed to be armed, officers should generally do so in containment mode while considering the available tactical advantages, including cover and concealment where available. The goal is to maintain observation of the suspect and the tactical advantage while coordinating the response of additional units and other resources for a perimeter with the objective of containing the suspect and taking him into custody safely. The decision to pursue an armed suspect in apprehension mode may be appropriate when the suspect is at a tactical disadvantage and an arrest can be accomplished with limited risk to officers or innocent parties.*

Officers Lockwood and Castanon engaged in a foot pursuit of an armed suspect in apprehension mode, rather than pursuing him in containment mode. Containment of an armed suspect demands optimal situational awareness. The ability to maintain the tactical advantage rests on the ability of the officers to effectively communicate, thus ensuring a coordinated effort and successful resolution. Generally, officers are discouraged from pursuing armed suspects on foot. Nonetheless, officers must be afforded a level of discretion regarding the appropriateness of their decision to engage in foot pursuit of an armed suspect.

The UOFRB noted Officers Lockwood and Castanon were in close proximity to Edmond as they pursued Edmond through a multi-unit apartment complex and the length of the foot pursuit was very brief. The UOFRB majority opined that after initiating their foot pursuit of Edmond, Officers Lockwood and Castanon maintained an unsafe distance while pursuing Edmond through a narrow walkway and placed themselves in a tactically disadvantageous position. The UOFRB majority noted that Officer Lockwood was five to seven feet from Edmond when Edmond turned towards him armed with a handgun and an OIS occurred.

The UOFRB minority reviewed the same set of facts and noted that the incident was fluid and only lasted approximately six to eight seconds from the time Officers Lockwood and Castanon began pursuing the suspect after forming the opinion that Edmond was armed with a handgun. The UOFRB minority considered that officers' ability to keep visual of a suspect prior to containment is imperative during any foot pursuit. The UOFRB minority opined that due to the brevity of the foot pursuit, the officers' ability to transition to containment mode was negated and their actions were not a substantial deviation.

In this case, I would have preferred Officers Lockwood and Castanon maintain a position of cover and stay in containment mode while they broadcast Edmond's actions, direction of travel and establish a perimeter as they planned to do when they discussed tactics prior to this encounter.

Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB majority determined, and I concur, that Officers Lockwood and Castanon's decision to pursue an armed suspect, in apprehension mode, was a substantial deviation, without justification, from approved Department tactical training. I will direct this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Additional Tactical Debrief Topics

Required Equipment – The investigation revealed that Officers Lockwood and Castanon left their side-handle batons in their police vehicle. Additionally, Officer Lockwood also left his Hobble Restraint Device (HRD) inside of his police vehicle. Officers Lockwood and Castanon are reminded of the importance of having their required field equipment on their person to allow for additional use of force options during an incident. I will direct this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Foot Pursuit Broadcast – The investigation revealed that when the situation quickly escalated from a consensual encounter to a detention and foot pursuit, Officer Castanon was faced with a rapidly evolving scenario and was required to process multiple tasks. Officer Castanon did realize his role and requested a, “Backup for a 415 man with a gun,” at 47th Street and Budlong Avenue. However, he did not include that he and Officer Lockwood were also in foot pursuit of Edmond and nor did he provide an updated location. Additionally, Officer Castanon did not broadcast Edmond’s description or Edmond’s direction of travel. Officer Castanon is reminded of the importance of providing the location of the officers and other relevant information to ensure that responding units are able to respond in a tactically safe and effective manner. When feasible, this is best accomplished prior to taking police action. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Non-Conflicting Simultaneous Commands – The investigation revealed that while they were engaged in foot pursuit of Edmond, Officers Lockwood and Castanon gave simultaneous commands to Edmond for him to show his hands and get on the ground. Although the commands were non-conflicting, the officers are reminded that simultaneous commands can sometimes lead to confusion and non-compliance. I will direct this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Running with Service Pistol Drawn – While pursuing Edmond and subsequently entering the common area of an apartment complex Officer Lockwood drew his service pistol. Officer Lockwood continued to run after Edmond with his service pistol drawn and a short time later was involved in an OIS. Officer Lockwood is reminded that there is a heightened concern for an unintentional discharge when running with a service pistol drawn. I will direct this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Single Handed Shooting – The investigation revealed that Officer Lockwood utilized a one-handed shooting grip on his service pistol at the time of the OIS. Although the Los Angeles Police Department teaches a one-handed shooting technique, a two-handed shooting grip utilizing either a Harries or Chapman flashlight technique would be more tactically advantageous and provide a more stable shooting platform. Officer Lockwood is reminded to utilize a two-handed shooting grip whenever feasible. I will direct this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Situational Awareness (Broadcast wrong unit designation) – The investigation revealed that Officer Castanon broadcast the incorrect unit designation when he broadcast the help call.

Although he provided the correct unit designation during a subsequent broadcast when he requested an RA for Edmond, Officer Castanon is reminded of the importance of accurately broadcasting all pertinent information when requesting help. I will direct this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Updating Status – The investigation revealed that Officers Lockwood and Castanon did not update their status from 47th Street and Budlong Avenue to 4721 South Budlong Avenue until after the officers had pursued Edmond into the multi-unit apartment complex and the OIS had already occurred. The officers are reminded of the importance of updating their status to ensure that CD is aware of their location should the incident necessitate the response of additional personnel. I will direct this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Bloodborne Pathogens – The investigation revealed Officer Castanon did not don protective gloves prior to handcuffing Edmond who was bleeding from multiple gunshot wounds including one on his right hand. In an effort to enhance future performance and employee wellness, I will direct this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command and Control is the use of active leadership to direct others while using available resources to coordinate a response, accomplish tasks and minimize risk. Command uses active leadership to establish order, provide stability and structure, set objectives and create conditions under which the function of control can be achieved with minimal risk. Control implements the plan of action while continuously assessing the situation, making necessary adjustments, managing resources, managing the scope of the incident (containment), and evaluating whether existing Department protocols apply to the incident.

Command and Control is a process where designated personnel use active leadership to command others while using available resources to accomplish tasks and minimize risk. Active leadership provides clear, concise, and unambiguous communication to develop and implement a plan, direct personnel and manage resources. The senior officer or any person on scene who has gained sufficient situational awareness shall initiate Command and Control and develop a plan of action. Command and Control will provide direction, help manage resources, and make it possible to achieve the desired outcome. Early considerations of PATROL will assist with the Command and Control process (Los Angeles Police Department, Training Bulletin, Volume XLVII Issue 4, July 2018).

Line Supervision – Defined. A supervisor who has the specific responsibility of issuing directions and orders to designated subordinates shall be considered as having the duty of line supervisor and shall be held accountable for achieving conformance with the directions and orders that he/she issues (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 135).

Incident Commander (IC) – In accordance with Department Policy, the IC sets the objectives, the strategy and directs the tactical response. Directing the tactical response

means applying tactics appropriate to the strategy, assigning the right resources and monitoring performance (Supervisor's Field Operations Guide, Volume 2, LAPD Emergency Operations Guide).

The investigation revealed Sergeant Navarro was the first supervisor to arrive to the OIS location to the rear of 4721 South Budlong Avenue. Upon his arrival at scene, he observed a skirmish line that was formed to contain a large crowd in Vermont Square Park. Sergeant Navarro believed the scene was contained at the time and responded to the rear of 4721 South Budlong Avenue where he located the involved officers. Sergeant Navarro immediately determined an OIS had occurred and separated both Officers Lockwood and Castanon. Sergeant Navarro directed Officer Lockwood to turn off his BWV, took custody of the BWV, obtained a Public Safety Statement (PSS), and monitored him. Additionally, Sergeant Navarro admonished Officer Lockwood not to discuss the incident. Sergeant Navarro believed he broadcast and declared himself the IC and directed personnel to secure the crime scene and continued to coordinate resources.

The investigation revealed Sergeant Adkins was the second supervisor to arrive at the OIS location to the rear of 4721 South Budlong Avenue where he located Sergeant Navarro along with Officers Lockwood and Castanon. Sergeant Navarro had already separated Officers Lockwood and Castanon and was in the process of obtaining a PSS from Officer Lockwood. Sergeant Adkins monitored Officer Castanon, verified his BWV was deactivated, took custody of his BWV, and obtained a PSS. Additionally, Sergeant Adkins admonished Officer Castanon not to discuss the incident. Sergeant Adkins directed an additional GED unit to accompany Edmond to the hospital and assisted with securing the crime scene. Sergeant Adkins continued to monitor Officer Castanon until he was released to FID.

The UOFRB noted that all supervisors responded to scene after the OIS had occurred and the tactical situation had concluded. The UOFRB noted all sergeants met the requirements of supervisors after a Categorical Use of Force incident. As is expected, the sergeants adhered to their roles as supervisors and completed their assigned tasks. The sergeants ensured post Categorical protocols were adhered to by admonishing, separating, and monitoring their assigned officer until they were relieved.

The actions of Sergeants Navarro and Adkins were consistent with Department supervisory training and my expectations of field supervisors during a critical incident.

Tactical Debrief

In conducting an objective assessment of this case, the UOFRB majority determined, and I concur that Officers Lockwood and Castanon's actions were a substantial deviation, without justification, from Department policy and training, thus requiring a finding of Administrative Disapproval.

Each tactical incident also merits a comprehensive debriefing. In this case, there were identified areas where improvement could be made. A Tactical Debrief is the appropriate forum for the involved personnel to discuss individual actions that took place during this incident.

Therefore, I will direct that Officers Lockwood and Castanon attend a Tactical Debrief and that the specific identified topics be discussed.

Note: Additionally, the Tactical Debrief shall also include the following mandatory discussion points:

- Use of Force Policy;
- Equipment Required/Maintained;
- Tactical Planning;
- Radio and Tactical Communication (including Code Six);
- Tactical De-Escalation;
- Command and Control; and,
- Lethal Force.

General Training Update (GTU)

On August 1, 2019, Officers Lockwood and Castanon attended a GTU. All mandatory topics were covered including the Force Option Simulator and Foot Pursuits.

Drawing/Exhibiting

Department policy relative to drawing and exhibiting a firearm is: *"An officer's decision to draw or exhibit a firearm should be based on the tactical situation and the officer's reasonable belief there is a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified"* (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume No. 1, Section 556.80)

Officer Lockwood

According to Officer Lockwood, based on Edmond's actions to avoid contact, his attempt to flee, as well as Edmond grabbing onto a heavy object in his pants pocket, Officer Lockwood believed Edmond was in possession of a handgun and attempting to gain access to the weapon to arm himself. Officer Lockwood drew his service pistol with his right hand to a modified low-ready, while holding his flashlight in his left hand as he pursued Edmond through a narrow pathway, based on his belief that the tactical situation could lead to the use of deadly force.

Officer Lockwood recalled,

"As I continued to follow him, I could see that we had a narrow pathway which didn't provide a lot of cover. Believing that this guy was possibly armed with a firearm, I drew out my weapon."¹¹

So I unholstered because I believed that this guy was armed with a firearm, and that this tactical situation could lead to the use of deadly force."¹²

Officer Castanon

According to Officer Castanon, immediately after he handcuffed Edmond, his attention was drawn to Collins. Officer Castanon did not know what Collins' intentions were when Collins climbed the fence, considering it was immediately after Officers Castanon and Lockwood had chased Edmond from a gang related gathering, and had been involved in an OIS. Based on his training and experience, Officer Castanon believed Collins may be armed with a firearm and an associate gang member attempting to assist Edmond. Officer Castanon drew his service pistol to a low-ready as he gave Collins commands to stay back based on Collins' actions of climbing a fence adjacent to the OIS location immediately following the OIS. Additionally, Officer Castanon believed the situation could arise to that point where deadly force would be necessary.

Officer Castanon recalled,

"So which directed my attention towards that individual who I believed climbed the fence. I made contact with that individual. Didn't know who he was. Didn't know why he was hopping the fence to come -- I gave him commands to -- to stay back. I drew my firearm at a low-ready position in that general direction where the individual was standing. And I gave him commands to stand back."¹³

Due to the fact that we already had one person armed with a firearm. We know it's a large gang group. We know that gang members have firearms. We know that they're -- they're in - - we've had -- from my training and experience, we've had large groups, multiple gang members armed with firearms to protect themselves from enemy gangs, from shootings when they're out in the open. I didn't know if this guy was armed with a firearm, this individual that climbed the fence. I don't know what his intentions were to hurt myself or my partner. And due to the fact that he may be armed with a firearm, and the situation could arise to that point where deadly force would be necessary, I drew my firearm."¹⁴

¹¹ Officer Lockwood, Page 11, lines 14-17.

¹² Officer Lockwood, Page 21, lines 2-5.

¹³ Officer Castanon, Page 22-23, lines 23-25, 1-2, and 4-8.

¹⁴ Officer Castanon, Page 23, lines 11-24.

In this case, the UOFRB conducted a thorough evaluation of the reasonableness of Officers Lockwood's Drawing/Exhibiting. The UOFRB noted that Edmond was armed with a handgun and was fleeing into a dark, unknown location. Edmond's actions presented a potential deadly threat to the community.

The UOFRB conducted a diligent and individual assessment of each officer's articulation regarding their decision to draw/exhibit their service pistols. The UOFRB considered that Officer Lockwood was an experienced gang enforcement officer and observed there were numerous unidentified gang members that were gathered within the large group of individuals at the park.

The UOFRB noted that Officer Lockwood had observed Edmond grasp a heavy object in his right front pants pocket and formed the opinion based on his training and experience, as well as Edmond's actions, that Edmond was armed with a handgun. Officer Lockwood drew his service pistol based on his belief that Edmond was armed with a handgun and due to the possibility that the tactical situation could lead to the use of deadly force. According to Officer Lockwood, as he engaged in foot pursuit of Edmond, he observed a narrow walkway which Edmond was about to run through which was a potentially disadvantages tactical position. In addition, Officer Lockwood did not know the layout of the multi-unit apartment complex and the lighting was poor throughout the location.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer Lockwood while faced with similar circumstances, would reasonably believe that there was a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified.

Therefore, I find Officer Lockwood's Drawing/Exhibiting to be In-Policy, No Further Action.

In this case, the UOFRB conducted a thorough evaluation of the reasonableness of Officer Castanon's Drawing/Exhibiting. The UOFRB noted that Officer Castanon had observed Edmond's hands were near his waist and appeared to be concealing an object. Based on his training and experience, coupled with Edmond's actions, Officer Castanon formed the opinion that Edmond was armed with a handgun.

The UOFRB noted that Officer Castanon did not draw his service pistol while in foot pursuit of Edmond and instead took on the role of communications officer as he was positioned to the rear. Immediately following the OIS, Officer Castanon proceeded to broadcast shots fired, officer needs help. Officer Castanon then handcuffed Edmond and took him into custody. Immediately after he completed handcuffing Edmond, Officer Castanon witnessed Collins climb over the north fence of the multi-unit apartment complex, which bordered the south portion of Vermont Square Park. Officer Castanon drew his service pistol based on his training and experience as well as his observations that there were gang members present within the large group of individuals at the park, and they are commonly known to be armed with weapons. Additionally, Officer Castanon did not know the intentions of Collins, and at the time Officers Castanon and Lockwood were isolated and by themselves in a dark area, waiting for additional resources.

Officer Castanon drew his service pistol based on his belief that Collins may be armed and that the tactical situation may escalate to where deadly force was necessary.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer Castanon, while faced with similar circumstances, would reasonably believe that there was a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified.

Therefore, I find Officer Castanon's Drawing/Exhibiting to be In-Policy, No Further Action.

Use of Force – General¹⁵

It is the policy of this Department that personnel may use only that force which is "objectively reasonable" to:

- *Defend themselves;*
- *Defend others;*
- *Effect an arrest or detention;*
- *Prevent escape; or,*
- *Overcome resistance*

The Department examines reasonableness using Graham v. Connor and from the articulated facts from the perspective of a Los Angeles Police Officer with similar training and experience placed in generally the same set of circumstances. In determining the appropriate level of force, officers shall evaluate each situation in light of facts and circumstances of each particular case. Those factors may include, but are not limited to:

- *The seriousness of the crime or suspected offense;*
- *The level of threat or resistance presented by the subject;*
- *Whether the subject was posing an immediate threat to officers or a danger to the community;*
- *The potential for injury to citizens, officers or subjects;*
- *The risk or apparent attempt by the subject to escape;*
- *The conduct of the subject being confronted (as reasonably perceived by the officer at the time);*
- *The amount of time and any changing circumstances during which the officer had to determine the type and amount of force that appeared to be reasonable;*
- *The availability of other resources;*
- *The training and experience of the officer;*
- *The proximity or access of weapons to the subject;*

¹⁵ Special Order No. 4, 2020 – Policy on the Use of Force - Revised, was adopted by the Department on February 5, 2020, after this incident occurred.

- *Officer versus subject factors such as age, size, relative strength, skill level, injury/exhaustion and number officers versus subjects; and,*
- *The environmental factors and/or other exigent circumstances.*
(Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.10)

Lethal Use of Force

Law enforcement officers are authorized to use deadly force to:

- *Protect themselves or others from what is reasonably believed to be an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury; or,*
- *Prevent a crime where the subject's actions place person(s) in imminent jeopardy of death or serious bodily injury; or,*
- *Prevent the escape of a violent fleeing felon when there is probable cause to believe the escape will pose a significant threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or others if apprehension is delayed. In this circumstance, officers shall, to the extent practical, avoid using deadly force that might subject innocent bystanders or hostages to possible death or injury (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume No.1, Section 556.10).*

Officer Lockwood – 9mm, four rounds fired in a northwesterly direction. All rounds were fired from an approximate distance of five to seven feet in the time span of approximately 1.1 seconds.

According to Officer Lockwood, he briefly lost sight of Edmond as Edmond maneuvered around a corner of the apartment complex and into a rear courtyard area. As Officer Lockwood ran past the corner of the building Officer Lockwood regained sight of Edmond and observed Edmond turning back toward Officer Lockwood. Officer Lockwood observed Edmond had a pistol grip on a black handgun in his left hand. Based on Edmond's movement, Officer Lockwood believed that Edmond was turning to shoot at him. Officer Lockwood fired his service pistol three times, utilizing a one-handed grip, in order to defend himself from the deadly threat presented by Edmond. Based on the minimal amount of time Officer Lockwood had to react, he stated he was unable to use the sights of his service pistol to gain a sight picture and was point shooting. Officer Lockwood assessed as he fired in order to determine if his shots were hitting and effective. Officer Lockwood observed Edmond fall to the ground at which time Officer Lockwood stopped firing. Immediately after Edmond fell to the ground, Officer Lockwood observed the firearm hit the ground in close proximity to Edmond. Officer Lockwood continued to fire his service pistol until he no longer believed Edmond was an immediate threat.

Note: The FID investigation revealed Officer Lockwood fired four rounds from his service pistol.

Officer Lockwood recalled,

"It was a very brief second that it appeared like he was out of sight. As I came into that little area, I observed him turning, waving his body to the right, basically turning back towards

me. At that time, I believed I observed what was a black handgun in his left hand. I fired approximately what I believe to be three shots in his direction one handed with my left hand holding the flashlight, illuminating him. It was at that time I noticed he fell to the ground, and I heard the loud clank, and I observed a black handgun fall right behind him.¹⁶

So as he's starting to run to the right around the, I guess you'd call that the rear of the apartment complex, it's as his body is starting to turn towards his right back in my direction is when I observe what I believe to be a black firearm in his left hand. To be perfectly honest, I believe it had just started to come around, and it was still pointed maybe in I would say a northern direction.¹⁷

As I came around, he was starting to turn. I can't say exactly how far through the turn he was. At that point, though, I perceived that he was turning to shoot at me. And being afraid that he was going to shoot me is when I fired. And I can't recall if his body stopped turning then due to being shot, or if it turned around further to the right.¹⁸

So based on the way of how quickly it unfolded and with how I was holding my firearm, I was not actually able to gain a sight picture of my sights. And more or less, I was doing a point shooting, attempting to point my firearm in the direction of the suspect and get a close proximity hit.¹⁹

Yes. So as I was firing, I was assessing whether my shots were hitting and were being effective. And as I was firing, I was assessing to see if he was dropping and the firearm was falling out of his hand, or if he was continuing to turn and try and engage me. And I perceived as I fired those three shots that they were effective. I observed him fall. I stopped firing. I then observed the firearm hit the ground.²⁰

As he fell, he actually was falling backwards towards his back. As he fell on his back, both hands shot out into an upward and outward motion to show me he had nothing in his hands, while simultaneously, the firearm fell directly behind him fairly close to his head, because I could observe his head was -- initially, I could see the firearm.²¹

It was -- it was very dark in the back. I don't believe there was any lights other than ambient lighting from inside the apartment complex, as well as lighting from the park. I held my flashlight. It's possible it was just being held down in a momentary, so it could have been sporadic. But I believe I was holding it with intention of getting a constant light to gain visual of the suspect during the whole time I was firing.²²

¹⁶ Officer Lockwood, Page 12, lines 4-14.

¹⁷ Officer Lockwood, Page 23-24, lines 25, 1-5, and 7-9

¹⁸ Officer Lockwood, Page 25, lines 5-11.

¹⁹ Officer Lockwood, Page 25, lines 17-22.

²⁰ Officer Lockwood, Page 26-27, lines 18-25 and 1.

²¹ Officer Lockwood, Page 27, lines 4-10.

²² Officer Lockwood, Page 28, lines 3-11.

Once I exited that little rear alcove area to the rear, and I perceived the threat with the suspect.²³

I believed he had a firearm.²⁴

So he had -- his left hand appeared to be in a -- how do you describe it? I guess you'd say a pistol grip or a firearm grip. And it appeared to be a black object in his left hand as he was turning towards me.²⁵

Because as I was firing and assessing, through the firing, I observed him to start to fall back, and the gun fall and hit the ground. So at that point, I no longer believed he was an immediate threat."²⁶

In this case, the UOFRB conducted a thorough review and analysis of the reasonableness of Officer Lockwood's use of lethal force. The UOFRB took into consideration that Edmond turned suddenly and without warning toward Officer Lockwood and was armed with a handgun.

The UOFRB considered that upon his arrival at scene, Officer Lockwood exited his police vehicle and attempted to gain information on the large group of individuals that had gathered at Vermont Square Park while additionally looking for persons of interest. As Officer Lockwood began walking east toward Budlong Avenue from the center of the park, he observed Edmond attempting to evade contact and quickly exit the park. Officer Lockwood followed Edmond to determine if Edmond was armed or possibly engaged in criminal activity. As Officer Lockwood reached the west sidewalk of Budlong Avenue, he illuminated Edmond with his flashlight and observed Edmond lose his footing. Officer Lockwood observed Edmond grasp a heavy object in his right front pants pocket and formed the opinion, based on his training and experience, coupled with Edmond's actions, that Edmond was armed with a handgun.

Officer Lockwood initiated a foot pursuit of Edmond west through a multi-unit apartment complex and provided clear commands to Edmond to show his hands and get on the ground. Edmond did not comply with the commands and Officer Lockwood drew his service pistol prior to pursuing Edmond through a narrow walkway. Edmond, suddenly and without warning, aggressively turned toward Officer Lockwood in a clockwise direction, holding a black handgun in the left hand, which led to Officer Lockwood firing four rounds from his service pistol.

The UOFRB considered the rapid speed in which Edmond turned toward Officer Lockwood armed with a handgun. The UOFRB also considered the minimal amount of time in which Officer Lockwood had to make a decision, as well as the imminent deadly threat posed by Edmond to the officers. The UOFRB considered the presentation by FID investigators which included that Officer Lockwood was five to seven feet from Edmond when Edmond began to aggressively turn toward Officer Lockwood while armed with a handgun.

²³ Officer Lockwood, Page 32, lines 22-24.

²⁴ Officer Lockwood, Page 3, line 3.

²⁵ Officer Lockwood, Page 33, lines 7-11.

²⁶ Officer Lockwood, Page 45, lines 21-25.

The UOFRB also noted that though Officer Lockwood, in response to the imminent deadly threat presented by Edmond's actions, fired four rounds from his service pistol in approximately 1.1 seconds, Officer Lockwood was continuously assessing Edmond's actions. Officer Lockwood ceased fire as he continually assessed and observed Edmond fall to the ground, no longer posing a deadly threat.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer Lockwood, would reasonably believe Edmond's actions presented an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury and that the Use of Lethal Force would be objectively reasonable.

Therefore, I find Officer Lockwood's Use of Lethal Force to be In Policy, No Further Action.

Additional/Equipment

Profanity – The investigation revealed that Officer Lockwood utilized profanity while engaged in foot pursuit of Edmond. Captain A. Neal, Serial No. 30599, Commanding Officer, 77th Street Patrol Division, advised that this issue was addressed through the issuance of an Employee Comment Sheet and the generation of a Supervisory Action Item (SAI). The Commanding Officer of Operations – South Bureau (OSB) and the Director of the Office of Operations (OO) concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

BWV Activation – The investigation revealed Officers Coats did not activate her BWV throughout the entire duration of the incident. Therefore, no BWV video was captured.

The issue was brought to the attention of Captain Neal who advised this deviation from Department policy was addressed through the issuance of a Comment Card and the generation of a SAI. The Commanding Officer of OSB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Officer Castanon's BWV was activated late. Officer Castanon exited his police vehicle and walked into Vermont Square Park. He made contact with an unidentified male and female, however his conversation with them was not captured due to his late BWV activation.

The issue was brought to the attention of Captain Neal who advised this deviation from Department policy was addressed through the issuance of a Comment Card and the generation of a SAI. The Commanding Officer of OSB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

The Office of Operations conducted a random inspection of BWV's associated to Officers Coats and Castanon from June 26, 2019, through July 25, 2019, and an inspection of BWV's from April 1, 2020, through April 30, 2020, for compliance with BWV and DICOV policies. The results of the inspection indicated late activations and buffering concerns. These identified concerns will be handled through the initiation of a personnel complaint investigation.

Audio/Video Recordings

Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS) – Officers Lockwood and Castanon’s police vehicle was equipped with a DICVS. However, the officers parked their vehicle at scene prior to the OIS and the DICVS was not activated. Fifty-three of the responding units had their DICVS activated. Because all the units responded after the OIS occurred, none of their DICVS footage captured the OIS.

Body Worn Video (BWV) – Officers Lockwood and Castanon activated their BWV prior to making contact with Edmond and recorded the entire incident including the OIS. One hundred fifty-one officers responded to the scene from various divisions and activated their BWV as required per Department policy. None of the additional responding officers’ BWV captured footage of the OIS.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'MICHEL R. MOORE', written over the printed name.

MICHEL R. MOORE
Chief of Police








Date: _____

5-27-20

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT
USE OF FORCE REVIEW BOARD REPORT

INC No. 035-19	CF No.	DR No. 19-1219278
SHOOTING		

REVIEW BOARD INFORMATION

Location of Incident 4721 South Budlong Avenue	RD 1204	Date of Incident July 26, 2019	Date and Time of Board Review April 20, 2020 1230 Hours
Chair Deputy Chief M. Baeza, Serial No. 26624	Signature of Approving Board Members: 		
Member (Office Representative) Commander M. Rimkunas, Serial No. 32211			
Member (Police Sciences and Training Bureau) Commander R. Flores, Serial No. 30995			
Member (Bureau) Commander A. Labrada, Serial No. 30398			
Member (Peer) Officer J. Wang, Serial No. 41144			
Presenting Commanding Officer Captain A. Neal, Serial No. 30599			
Notes: <div style="text-align: right;">RECEIVED JUN 04 2020 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL</div>			
Additional Considerations:			
Modification to Present Policy, Practices or Training:			
<div style="text-align: right;">  </div> <div style="text-align: right;"> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> COP Date Signed: <u>5/27/2020</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PC Date Submitted: <u>5/27/2020</u> </div>			

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Lockwood, Kurt		Serial No. 38804	Rank/Class Police Officer III	Incident No. 035-19
Length of Employment 12 years, 1 month		Current Division 77th Street	Time in Current Division 2 years, 4 months	
Use of Force Review Board		Chief of Police		Police Commission
Tactics <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		Tactics <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		Tactics <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Less-Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Less-Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Less-Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Non-Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Non-Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Non-Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Unintentional Discharge <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		Unintentional Discharge <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		Unintentional Discharge <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
Other Issues <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Other Issues <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Other Issues <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Notes:				
Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint		Notes:		
<input type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed				

***A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.**

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Castanon, Andrew		Serial No. 41832	Rank/Class Police Officer II	Incident No. 035-19
Length of Employment 4 years, 8 months	Current Division 77th Street		Time in Current Division 2 years, 6 months	

Use of Force Review Board	Chief of Police	Police Commission
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Other Issues</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)

Notes:

<u>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint <input type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed	Notes:
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***A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.**